DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO STUDY RELIGION
DIFFERENT
APPROACHES TO STUDY RELIGION
The
establishment of the ‘Science of Religion’ was the fulfillment of long awaited
and hard-labored efforts of many scholars.
This, in fact was the beginning for all the later developments in the
field of religion. Many branches of
learning began to concentrate on the study of religion. As a result many approaches/methods were
developed to study the various aspects of religions.
2.1 Anthropological Approach
Anthropology is
devoted to the study of human beings.[1] Its basis is culture. Anthropologists use
comparative method in order to find what is common to all humanity and ‘what is
distinctive of particular societies or groups of societies’.[2] From a religious point of view the anthropologists
do not confine to only major religions, they study the beliefs and practices of
all human societies. The anthropologists were mostly influenced by the
evolutionist ideology propounded by Charles R. Darwin. As a result most anthropologists used their
data for tracing the origin of religions.
2.1.1 Animism
Edward Burnett
Tylor (1832-1917), an English ethnologist was one of the first scholars to
apply evolutionary concepts to the study of religions, and is generally regarded
as the founder of the anthropological study of religion.[3] Tylor used comparative method to trace the
origin of religion from primeval man to the civilized man of his time. About its impact E.O. James writes “the
result was that he could indeed present a survey of the total history of man
and his culture, going back from the present to the past.”[4] Tylor wanted to prove that religion was not
the result of any revelation or supernatural intervention. The reason behind such a conclusion is
underlined as “the very doctrine of evolution functioned, so to say, as a basis
for the rejection of any supernaturalism, thereby rendering possible a
scholarly study of religion.”[5]
Tylor was
popularly known for his theory of animism.
Animism is “the belief that all living beings and natural phenomena
that appear to move or have life (Sun, Moon, Rivers, etc.) have individual
spirits (animas), some or all of which are appropriate objects of worship.”[6]
For Tylor, ‘the
earliest stage of religion’ consisted in the belief in souls, which is present
not only in human beings but in all natural organisms and objects. This
conviction has had far-reaching implications. For example “out of this came the
concepts of the separable human soul, whether in sleep or in death, and of the
pan-psychic aspect of the natural world; and thereby of the religious beliefs
and customs associated with them.”[7] Commenting on the theory of animism, Eric J.
Lott says “thus Tylor saw earlier animistic experience as the irreducible and
original source of later religious life.”[8] Tylor’s theory was criticized by Max Muller
and R. R. Marett.
2.1.2 Animatism
R. R. Marett
(1866-1943), an English anthropologist and disciple of Tylor proposed a theory
of the origin of religion called ‘animatism’ or dynamism or pre-animism. In his attempt to go beyond Tylor, Marett argued
that belief in souls or spirits is the result of reasoning. Before reasoning, there could have been
another stage which he called animatism.
This is explained as “he contended that at the beginning of man’s
religious development there was what he called a ‘super naturalistic’ stage, in
which man recognized an impersonal religious force which was rather felt than
reasoned out.”[9]
The animatism of
R. R. Marett is explained by E. O. James as “before man began to speculate
about dreams and visions, and formulate ideas concerning heroes and ancestors,
he appears to have been aroused by deeper emotions in the presence of
inexplicably and awe-inspiring phenomena.”[10]
Animatism is a
stage in which people responded with awe and wonder to an impersonal
supernatural force which they experienced as present in extraordinary natural
phenomena, events and persons.[11] This supernatural force was worshipped as Mana by the Melanesian
islanders. Mana means ‘undifferentiated
impersonal supernatural force’.[12] In short, animatism is belief in Mana. For Marett this was the first stage of
religion. In the words of Eric. J.
Sharpe, Marett chose to apply the Melanesian term mana to the Phenomenon
of impersonal power, supposedly experienced by primitive man, and claimed this
to be a source of belief in spirits, gods, and ultimately God.”[13] It is called pre-animism because it refers to
a stage preceding to the belief in animism.
2.1.3 Manism (Ancestor – Worship)
Hebert Spencer
(1820-1903), an Englishman proposed that ancestor worship is the beginning of
religion. This he derived from people’s
belief in spirits or ghosts. It is said
“from the belief in ghosts, he asserted, came ancestor-worship, the original
religious cult.”[14] In the words of Muller, for Spencer ‘the root
of every religion is ancestor-worship’.[15] According to Waardenburg “for Spencer,
religion started with the cult of ancestral spirits (manism) with the
assumption that, just as fear of the living is at the root of political
control, fear of the dead is at the root of religious control.”[16] E. O. James makes the point more clear as “on
the same animistic stratum Herbert Spencer rested his ghost theory in the
belief that the idea of God and religion as a whole could be derived from the
propitiation of the other-self of distinguished ancestors.”[17]
2.1.4 Supreme Beings or High Gods
In contrast to
the anthropologists whose theories were dominated by evolution, Andrew Langh
(1844-1912, Scotland
2.1.5 Magic
James G. Frazer
(1854-1947, Glasgow
Apart from these
traditional anthropologists who have done in-depth study on the various aspects
of human culture (cultural anthropology), now there are at least two more
varieties. One is the Social
anthropology which emphasizes the functional aspect of religion. For social anthropology religion is one of
the institutions like other social institutions. Social anthropology also stresses the
importance of the scholar to be a participant observer in the society studied.
The second new
addition is Diffusionist school. It
insists upon the necessity of studying various cultural circles or layers which
could have been caused by small migrations.
This will answer the question of similarities in cultures in different
religions.
A general
criticism against the anthropological approach is that it is confined to the
empirical religious phenomena and does not go to the original religious feeling. The second criticism is that, having studied
one or few religions, the anthropologists generalize the data. There is also the fear of approaching the
primitive religions with a hidden agenda like the missionaries.
2.2 Sociological Approach
Having examined
the contributions of the great anthropologists, now it is appropriate to analyze
the sociological approach to study religion.
In order to evaluate the contribution of sociological approach to the
study of religion, a general understanding of sociology of religion is called
for.
2.2.1 Definition
By definition
“the sociology of religion is the study of the significant, and often subtle,
relationships which prevail between religion and social structures, and between
religion and social processes.”[22] The original aim of sociology was to find out
the ‘scientific account of the laws underlying the social fabric’.[23] In relation to religions “it is an essential
postulate of sociology that a human institution cannot be based on error and
falsehood, otherwise it could not have lasted.”[24] In brief, the main area of investigation for
the sociologist of religion is the inter-relatedness between society and
religion.
2.2.2 Task
It is said “a
sociologist of religion studies the processes by which religion enters into
human interaction and how the interaction of men influences religion.”[25] This task is empirical in nature. Further, it is appropriate because of its
intention to clarify the influence of religion on individuals on the one hand
and the influence of people on religion on the other. In the words of Joachim Wach “the sociologist
of religion will have to study and to classify with care the typologically
different organizational structures resulting from divergent concepts or
religious communion.”[26]
2.2.3 Concern
A brief look at
the concerns of the sociological approach to the study of religion will shed
further light on its importance. One of its
chief concerns is to evaluate the impact of religiosity on individuals and
society. It is maintained “the sociology
of religion does not concern itself with the truth or worth of the
supraempirical beliefs upon which religion rests. It is concerned with the effects of these in
the historical experience of men and in the development of human societies.”[27]
Of course, sociology
from its very birth showed itself immediately concerned with the role and the
function of religion in the dynamism of societies.[28] On the contrary, Daniel L. Hodges writes “although
social Scientists rarely say so explicitly, most of them believe it is
scientifically illegitimate to include as propositions any statements about the
supernatural in the theories which attempt to explain or predict religious
behavior.”[29] This negative concern needs further
clarification. Even if sociologists want
to study society and its institution, they cannot ignore the impact of religion
on the society or society’s influence on religion.
2.2.4 Method
It is suggested
that “as a social science sociology must take a naturalistic approach to the study
of religion, but it must also remain sensitive to those areas where men take
diverse points of view based upon their commitments of faith.”[30] Of course, although sociology does not pass
judgment upon questions of faith itself, it offers valuable empirical data for
a better understanding of religion from a sociological point of view.
2.2.5 Religion
The common
understanding about the origin of religion in the sociological perspective of
religion is that, it is the product of society.
Accepting this view has its own constrains. For example, “if we adopt an
interpretation of religious beliefs and organization as products of
underlying social forces, then the most plausible view of religious movements
is that they are off-shoots or appendages of more substantial shifts in the
infra-structure of society.”[31] There is a close relation between religion
and society. For instance we cannot
understand the inner form of a society unless we understand its religion.[32] In any case whether society influences
religion or the opposite is a difficult task for the sociologist of religion to
investigate.
Similarly a
verification of the relation between religion and culture can supply more
details as to whether religion or society precedes to influence each
other. According to Christopher Dawson
“a fully developed culture involves a spiritual organization, and it is by this
spiritual organization that the essential form of the culture is most clearly
recognized.”[33] Further “the whole history of culture shows
that man has a natural tendency to seek a religious foundation for his social
way of life and that when culture loses its spiritual basis it becomes
unstable.”[34] Dawson
2.2.6 Functional Theory
According to functional
theory no human society exists without some form of religion. it is held that “it is an axiom of functional
theory that what has no function ceases to exist. Since religion has continued to exist from
time immemorial it obviously must have a function, or even a complex of
functions.”[35] It admits that religion involves ‘belief
in and a response to some kind of beyond’.
This belief in and response to some kind of beyond may be the origin of
religion. Then this religion influences
the society. Its influence is pictured
as “religion in terms of functional theory becomes significant in connection
with those elements of human experience which derive from the contingency,
powerlessness, and scarcity fundamentally characteristic of the human condition.”[36]
Another
development to be just noted is that “modern sociological approaches to the
study of religion have shown that religion cannot be understood as an
extra-social phenomenon which will diminish in the course of social evolution.”[37] This is in keeping with the original
commitment of sociology as a social science, in relation to religion.
2.2.7 Max Weber (1864-1920, Germany
Weber was a
pioneer of the sociology of religion. In
the words of Joachim Wach “the credit for having been the first to conceive of
a systematic sociology of religion belongs to Max Weber.”[38] According to Weber, religious behavior can be
understood only through its meaning for the individuals concerned. He writes “the external courses of religious
behavior are so diverse that an understanding of this behavior can only be
achieved from the view point of the individual concerned – in short, from the
view point of the religious behavior’s “meaning” (Sinn).”[39] In the words of Waardenburg, Weber used the historical
and functional approach. He also had a
growing concern for ‘comparative studies’.[40] For Weber, “the most elementary forms of
behavior motivated by religious or magical factors are oriented to this world.”[41] Weber says that even the ends of the
religious and magical actions are predominantly economic.[42] In the words of Waardenburg “opposing current
theories, Weber held that religion was first purposive and only later become
symbolic.”[43]
2.2.8 William Robertson Smith (1846-1897, Scotland
Smith was an Old
Testament scholar. His study of Semitic
religion revealed that Semitic religions have to be studied as a whole in their
proper context. It is opined “taking up
the concept of totemism – that is, the relation between a social group and an
organic species he asserted that the sacrifice of the sacred clan animal among
the ancient Semites established a communion among the members of the clan and
with the clan god through the consumption of the flesh and blood of the
animal. Thus sacrifice was a social
integrative and conservatively traditional act.”[44] He, thus, proposed a kind of linear
evolution. According to him, religion
was part of the social life. People
unconsciously followed the habitual practice of the society in which they lived. He also makes a distinction between the
religious temper of ancient and modern people.
The distinction is that for moderns religion is above all a matter of
individual conviction and reasoned belief, but to the ancients it was a part of
the citizen’s public life, reduced to fixed forms, which he was not bound to
understand and was not at liberty to criticize or to neglect. In short Smith emphasized the social
character of religion and asserted that totemism was the most elementary form
of religious life.
2.2.9 Emile Durkheim (1858-1917, France
For Durkheim, religion
is inherently a social reality. For
example “sociologically speaking, religion is society in a projected and
symbolized form; the reality which is symbolized by religion is a social
reality. Consequently religion should be
studied as a response to specific social needs.”[45] Durkheim in his The Elementary Forms of
the Religious Life writes, “the
most barbarous and the most fantastic rites and the strangest myths translate
some human need, some aspect of life, either individual or social.”[46] According to him the idea of mystery was not
given to the human. It is the human who
has forged it with his own hands. K. P.
Aleaz says “according to Durkheim religion is the essence of the social bond.”[47]
Eric J. Lott
argues that “there is, in any case, insufficient evidence to support Durkheim’s
belief that religion is essentially and originally totemic.”[48] He thinks that Durkheim’s theory is the
result of a biased pre-conceived idea about religion.
2.3 Historical Approach
Historical approach
is different from the earlier history of religion. Historical approach is only one part of the
history of religions. It is in this
sense the expression historical approach is used here. According to J. G.
Arapura, “in a genuine sense the Dutch Scholar Cornelius Tiele may be regarded
as its founder.”[49] The method applied in the historical approach
is a kind of methodological naturalism or gnosticism. To understand better, “this approach
consisted of gathering data from all times and places, arranging them
systematically, interpreting them within a strictly natural and human
framework, exploring their inner emotional aspects, and doing a comparative
study to discover the essential laws of the development of religion.”[50] One fact is obvious that, the historical
approach generally includes comparative method in its scientific sense. On the other hand,
The protagonists of a strictly
historical approach emphasize the use of historical – critical methods, a
rigorous practice of philology and other subsidiary disciplines necessary for
the study of history, and insist on factual – descriptive expositions, not
infrequently accompanied by a minimum of interpretation as to the meaning of
the data presented.[51]
In order to
avoid unnecessary subjective elements in the process of study Max Muller
suggested that “the historian of religion must try to be as free as possible
from all preconceived opinions.[52]
Ursula king writes about the significance of historical method as “it was
not only the concern of historical truth but also the need to free the study of
religion from the dominance of a priori theological and philosophical
speculation which required a strong insistence on the use of the historical
method.”[53]
At the outset the historical method is not confined to studying about
superhuman beings alone. It also studies
all religious practices and manifestations in their proper contexts because
every religious element is, significant only in its own proper context.[54]
Robert D. Baired views historical method on the basis of his definition of
history. He writes “my functional definition of history is that history is the
descriptive study of the human past.”[55] This definition holds good if only religion
is treated as an integral part of humanity.
According to Muller, “there is but one method that leads to really
trustworthy and solid results and this is the Historical Method.”[56] He also highlights the intention of the historical
method as a method going back through various layers to find out the real
religious incident. To put it in a
nutshell “the principle of the historical school is not to ignore the present,
but to try to understand the present by means of the past.”[57] In this venture, a historian might use myths
positively as data.
Historical school however is not fully free from limitations. Generally it
is burdened with surplus data without adequate ‘integration’. It is also handicapped in relating the
acquired knowledge to wider questions and concerns.[58] Another basic observation is found in the
words of Eric J. Lott that “the historical conditioning to which all religions
are subject cannot be denied, but in so far as the historian looks only for
empirically verifiable reasons for events, it is questionable how far he is
able to investigate, qua historian, the essential inner meaning of any religious
tradition.”[59]
2.4 Phenomenological Approach
The main task of the phenomenological approach is to study the essence of
religion. To do so the phenomenologists
study various structures of religion on the basis of materials derived from
other approaches to study religion. In
order to have a better understanding of the phenomenological approach, a
general outline of phenomenology may be helpful. This would include definition, founders, task
and method of phenomenology. After that
the investigations of at least four leading phenomenologists and their data can
lay the foundation for a meaningful evaluation of the method.
2.4.1 Definition
Phenomenology has been variously defined by scholars. Probably consultation of a few definitions
would be of great help in understanding what phenomenology is really about. According to K. P. Aleaz, “Phenomenology may
be primarily understood as a systematic and comparative classification of all
religious phenomena.”[60] Another dimension of phenomenology is found
in the definition of J. G. Arapura that “Phenomenology is the systematic
discussion of what appears.”[61] A more useful definition is that “the
phenomenological method is a way of describing rather than a way of
explaining.”[62] That is, describing the essence of the
phenomenon, within one’s own environment.
Thus phenomenology consists of a classification of religious phenomena,
discussion of the phenomena and description of the phenomena.
2.4.2 Founders
The first person to outline the principles of phenomenology was P. D.
Chantepie de la Saussay. He dwelt on the
‘need for historical investigation into religions traditions to move on
to the higher plane of phenomenological investigation of the essential
inner structures of religion’.[63] It was Husserl who laid the basic
philosophical background to phenomenology in his Science of Pure
Consciousness. Two of his principles
dominate phenomenology. One is Epoche
i.e., ‘bracketing, or suspension of judgment regarding the phenomenal object’. The second is, eidetic vision, i.e.,
‘the intuitive, undistorting grasp of the ‘essence’ of the object’. As a summary Eric J. Lott says that “in any
case the basic concerns of phenomenology, i.e., epoche and Einfuhlung
(empathy) in particular, have been accepted in religious studies generally,
certainly in comparative religion.”[64]
2.4.3 Task of Phenomenology
One of the major tasks of phenomenologists is to ‘describe the essence of
the phenomenon, and not to “locate” it.
In other words, the phenomenologist is seeking the meaning or essence
rather than cause or truth.[65] He also has to describe the meaning of common
themes among religions, regardless of their historical tradition or geographic
location’. The phenomenologists have to
interpret the symbols in a way that enhances the self knowledge of human
beings.
2.4.4 Methods
In their task of describing the phenomena, the phenomenologists employ a
method called reduction or bracketing out.
This they do in order to find out the real meaning of the
phenomena. It is also suggested that
“the phenomenologists grasp meaning through intuition.”[66] Some phenomenologists, however view phenomenology
as a method of organizing or classifying the data. Their method can be called as empirical
phenomenology. In fact, Husserl’s epoche
and eidetic vision are the two fundamental principles of
phenomenology. Besides, the richest material for the phenomenology of religion
is supplied by religious acts, cults and customs’. Phenomenology also needs to consider other
aspects like, ‘objects of belief and of worship’.[67]
The positive aspect of phenomenology is that it maintains
objectivity. It also insists upon a ‘value-free,
detached investigation’. According to J.
G. Arapura “the truly revolutionary aspect of the phenomenological
investigation of religion is that through it there has implicitly taken place a
shift from all other realms of reality to the realm of consciousness as the
primary focal point in the quest for religious essence.”[68]
Apart from the empirical phenomenology there is also a historical
phenomenology. Ursula King writes, “religious
phenomena are here systematically studied in their historical context as well
as in their structural connections.”[69] While the earlier phenomenologists were busy
with structures and pattern, the modern phenomenologists, study the structures
and their connection in their specific historical context.
There are other phenomenologists who propose a ‘new style
phenomenology’. Its characteristic “is
moving from the search for timeless essences to a search for meaning inside
time.”[70] It is not just what it means, but what it
means to others. That is, the intention
of the phenomena. This has been
explained as “this primordial unity of subject and object, thinker and thought
about, is characteristic of phenomenology.”[71] Thus, the aim of the new style
phenomenological perspective is to trace the intention of the religious
phenomena.
2.4.5 Rudolf Otto (1869-1937, Germany
The sub title of Otto’s work The Idea of the Holy was ‘An inquiry
into the non-rational factor in the idea of the divine and its relation to the
rational’. This is the crux of Otto’s
thesis. For him “an object that can thus
be thought conceptually may be termed rational.”[72] The opposite of what is said above is the
subject matter of Otto’s investigation.
About the non-rational he says “it will be our endeavour to suggest this
unnamed something to the reader as far as we may, so that he may himself feel
it.”[73] To explain the non-rational Otto has used a
Latin word, numinous. To understand it further, “the
numinous is thus felt as objective and outside the self.”[74]
The nature of the numinous is further explained as “Mysterium tremendum”,
i.e., “its nature is such that it grips or stirs the human mind with this and
that determinate affective state.”[75] It is mysterium. “Conceptually mysterium denotes merely
that which is hidden and esoteric, which is beyond conception or understanding,
extraordinary and unfamiliar.”[76] Tremendum
is the positive aspect of it. It is not
fear in the strict sense. This positive aspect
can be experienced only in feeling. It
is this feeling which emerging in the mind of primeval man, forms the
starting-point for the entire religious development in history.[77]
Apart from ‘mysterium tremendum’, the numinous denotes fascination. The combination of these two is responsible
for the development of religions. The
relation between the rational and the non-rational constitute the final meaning
of the “Holy”. In summary “Mysterium tremendum et fascinans, these three words
give in a nutshell Otto’s insight into the non-rational element in our
religious consciousness.”[78]
The first criticism about Otto’s theory is that “instead of studying the ideas
of God and religion Otto undertook to analyze the modalities of the
religious experience.”[79] The second criticism is that “Otto is
possibly obsessed by the idea of keeping the numinous absolutely free from
other human activities except religious.”[80]
The third criticism is that “awesome” feelings described by Otto is the
result of ‘economic and psychic insecurity’.
Otto did not grasp it because of his theological and mystical
background. The fourth criticism is that
“Otto’s Idea of the Holy is basically a theological work or an inquiry
into the psychology of religion rather than a work in the history of
religions.”[81]
2.4.6
Nathan Soderblom (1866-1931, Swedish theologian
and historian of
religions)
Nathan Soderblom’s major contribution to the phenomenological approach to
study religion is the idea of “Holiness”.
He was of the opinion that there may be religions even without God, but
none, without the distinction between the holy and the profane. In other words “religious experience marked
by the presence of Holiness, was for him the heart of religion and hence the
central object of its study.”[82] His disciple Friedrich Heiler (1892-1967, Germany
2.4.7 Gerardus Van der Leeuw (1890-1950, Holland
Van der Leeuw stressed the importance of historical and exegetical
studies for the phenomenological understanding of religions. For him “Phenomenology seeks the phenomenon,
as such, the phenomenon, again is what appears.”[85] This is explained in his Religion in
Essence and Manifestation as “this principle has a threefold implication:
1. Something
exists, 2. This something appears, 3. Precisely because it ‘appears’ it is a
‘phenomenology’.[86] When someone tries to explain what appears,
then phenomenology arises. Thus
phenomenology is the systematic discussion of what appears. He focused on a wholly other “power” as the
object of religious experience – equivalent to Soderblom’s “Holiness” and
Otto’s “the Holy”.[87] For Leeuw, the experience of power varies
from people to people. The original
experience of the power is more important than the reflection upon it. Finding the original experience of the power
is the key aspect of religious study.
However, Leeuw was criticized for relaxing his original insistence upon
philology and history and devoting his effort to the ‘discernment and
presentation of timeless types, structures, and essences. He propounded an intuitive method for
arriving at his types and structures.[88]
Another phenomenologist, Joachim Wach (1898-1955) was interested in the
understanding of the practice and beliefs of all other cultures and
religions. To do so he insisted upon the
necessity of some personal religious predisposition in the inquirer, apart from
scholarly procedures.
2.4.8 Mircea Eliade
Eliade was a phenomenologist more concerned with historical development
of religions. His concentration was on
the ‘archaic expressions of religious experience’. Thomas L. Benson writes, “he saw these
expressions as archetypal responses to the presence of the sacred in this
worldly objects and in events that are regularly repeated within a time frame
that is cyclic rather than sequential.”[89] Eliade’s ideas can be understood from his
classic work The Sacred and the Profane.
Here he discussed that “man becomes aware of the sacred because it
manifests itself, shows itself, as something wholly different from the
profane.”[90] With regard to the origin and development or
religion he said, “it could be said that the history of religions – from the
most primitive to the most highly developed – is constituted by a great number
of hierophanies, by manifestations of sacred realities.”[91] For him the sacred and the profane are two
modes of being in the world, rather, ‘two existential situations assumed by man
in the course of his history’.
According to Jay J. Kim, “IN THE BROADEST SENSE, the chronicle of man’s
religions is composed of hierophanies – the manifestations of the sacred in
whatever forms, at all times, and in all places… whether it be a hierophany in
a stone or in a person as in the case with Jesus Christ, the same dialectic of
the sacred must be operative.”[92]
2.5 Psychological Approach
Psychology, in short, is the science of mind. When it is used for the scientific study of
religions it has a different connotation.
According to Eric J. Lott, “in this case the area of investigation will
be primarily the mental states, motivations and attitudes found in religious
contexts.”[93] In other words, psychology of religion
investigates the psyche rather than religion as such. Erich Fromm writes, “analysis of religion must not stop at
uncovering those psychological processes within man which underlay his
religious experience; it must proceed to discover the conditions which make for
the development of authoritarian and humanistic character structures,
respectively, from which different kinds of religious experience stem.”[94] This consideration is quite comprehensive.
Yet a broader outlook will be more beneficial.
The first task of psychology of religion is to look within human
experience to understand what religion means to persons.[95] The
second task of the psychology of religion is to explore the human’s inner
consciousness.[96]
To accomplish these tasks “from the beginning, the psychology of religion
has been said to have two fundamental methods: the observation of religious
individuals and the study of traditional content from the history of religion.”[97] in the words of L. W. Grensted, “the methods
employed by psychologists are those of experiment and observation, with result
capable of comparison and statistical analysis, coupled with the reports given
through introspection.”[98] Generally the psychological approach starts
from the individual contrary to other approaches which begin from the group,
tribe or community.
Further, the psychological approach to the study of religions considers
rituals seriously. It is said that
“compulsive neurotic patients exhibits numerous forms of private ritual.”[99]
To understand a particular religious behavior, it is important to
investigate its motive because “religious behavior springs from conscious and
unconscious motivation.”[100] The branch of psychology which attempts to
study such motive is called dynamic psychology, while descriptive psychology
aims at understanding religious experience, to explain the connections existing
between various structures.
2.5.1 William James (1842-1910, America
It is said “the most famous early attempt at a psychological account of
‘Religious sentiments’ was William James’ Varieties of Religious Experience.”[101] Because of this work, the psychology of
religion gained momentum, during the early par of the twentieth century. William James “viewed religious experience as
involving intense human emotions and feelings directed toward some unseen
order, reality, power “Out there” to which the personal stance is adjustment
and surrender.”[102] Perhaps his description of religious
experience is the result of a pre-conceived idea of God.
For James, religion involves both moods of contraction and moods of
expansion of one’s being. In other
words, it is, sorrow and happiness. In
order to explain the matter further, he divides the psyche (soul) into two
types. One is healthy soul and the other
is sick. Healthy soul is optimistic and
the sick soul is pessimistic. According
to him the completest religions would seem to be those in which the pessimistic
elements are best developed.[103]
Evaluating the view of James, on religious experience and religion,
Waardenburg contends that, his reference to unconscious has some relation to
deeper layers of reality. Further, “he
interpreted his cases apart from their socio-cultural context and hardly went
into religious history or anthropology.”[104] It is true that James’ theory alludes to a
form of fundamental reality. This is
what made him to coin the title of his work as “Varieties of religious
experience.”
2.5.2 SIGMUND FREUD (1856-1939)
Freud was the founder of depth psychology. He discovered the existence of the personal
unconscious.[105] In Freud’s thinking the unconscious is
essentially that in us which is bad, the repressed, that which is incompatible
with the demands of our culture and of our higher self.[106] He held that what is repressed can be brought
into consciousness despite the resistance of the unconscious. According to Hans Kung “his main insight was
that all psychical activity is at first unconscious.”[107]
For Freud, religion is the projection of infantile dependencies upon
imagined superhuman beings. The
expressions of these dependencies, he called collective neurosis. He also found that, there were many
non-religious motivations behind religions aspirations. The infantile dependencies, or the
obsessional childhood neurosis, Freud called, the “Oedipus complex.” According to him ‘the Oedipus complex is the
core of every neurosis.”[108] That is why, he said religion is
illusion. The process of detecting this
neurosis is called psychoanalysis. For
this, Freud chose to interpret dreams, as they are the out come of the
suppressed feelings, may be of childhood.
Regarding the Oedipus complex, Mc Cutchen remarks that “insofar as the
father’s influence actually has been complex and not simply authoritarian in
our own times, our contemporary mythology, our stories of encouragement, taken
seriously may reflect this more complicated image.”[109]
2.5.3 Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961, Switzerland
Jung’s psychological method is called ‘Analytical Psychology’. For Jung,
the psyche consists of two parts: consciousness and the unconscious. And “the
unconscious is older than the consciousness.”[110] Again he made a distinction between personal
and collective unconscious. The
difference between personal and collective unconscious is that “it contrast to
the personal unconscious, which is an accumulation of contents that have been
repressed during the life of the individual and is continuously being refined
with new materials, the collective unconscious consists entirely of elements
characteristic of the human species.”[111] The elements of the collective unconscious
are called ‘Archetypes’. For Jung, the collective unconscious is responsible
for the religious behavior.
[1]
Marc J. Swartz and David K. Jordan, Anthropology: Perspective on Humanity (Inc.:John
Wiley
& Sons, 1976) , p.2.
[2] Ibid.,
p.3.
[3]
Thomas L. Benson, The Encyclopedia of Religion, Vol. 14, p.69.
[4] E.
O. James, Comparative Religion, First Published as University Paper back
(London
Methane
& Co. Ltd., 1961), p.30.
[5] Ibid.,
p.31.
[6]
Marc J. Swartz and David K. Jordan, op. cit., p.664.
[7]
Thomas L. Benson, op. cit., p.70.
[8] P.
S. Daniel, David C. Scott, et al., Religious Traditions of India
1988) ,
p.21.
[9]
Waardenburg, Classical Approaches to the Study of Religion, Aims, Methods
and Theories
of
Research, I: Introduction and Anthology (Paris: Mouton, 1973) , p. 257.
[10]
E. O. James, op. cit., p.39.
[11]
Thomas L. Benson, op. cit., p.70.
[12]
Marc J. Swartz and David K. Jordan, op. cit., p.663.
[13]
Eric J. Sharpe, Comparative Religion, A History (London: Duckworth, 1975), p.68.
[14]
Thomas. L. Benson, op. cit., p.69.
[15]
F. Max Muller, Anthropological Religion, second AES Reprint (New Delhi
Educational
Services, 1986) , p.127.
[16]
Waardenburg, op. cit., p.29.
[17]
E. O. James, op. cit., p.37.
[18]
Waardenburg, op. cit., p.240.
[19] Ibid.,
p.33.
[20]
P. S. Daniel, David C. Scott et al., op. cit., p.21.
[21]
Tomas L. Benson, op. cit., p.71.
[22]
Thomas F. O’ Dea, The Sociology of Religion (Inc.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p.117.
[23]
Michael Hill, “Sociological Approaches” Contemporary Approaches to the Study
of Religion in 2 Volumes, edited by Frank Whaling, Volume II (Berlin:
Mouton Publishers, 1985), pp. 117,
118.
[24]
W.S.F. Pickering, Durkheim on Religion, A Selection of Reading
Translations
by Jacqueline Reading and W.S.F. Pickering (London: Rutledge & Kegan Paul,
1975) , p.103.
[25]
Richard. Knudten, The Sociology of Religion An Anthology (new
York
Company,
1967). p.26.
[26]
Joachim Watch, Sociology of Religion, Twelfth Impression (London
Chicago
Press, 1971) , p.34.
[27]
Thomas F. O’ Dea, op. cit., p.117.
[28]
Herve Carrier S. J., The Sociology of Religious Belonging (London
Todd, 1965), p.19.
[29]
Daniel L. Hodges, “Breaking a Scientific Taboo: Putting Assumptions about the
supernatural
into scientific theories of religion”, Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion,
Volume 13, No.4 (December, 1974), p.393.
[30]
Thomas F. O’ Dea, op. cit., p.33.
[31]
Michael Hill, op. cit., p.125.
[32]
Christopher Dawson, Religion and Culture (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), p.50.
[33] Ibid.,
p.65.
[34] Ibid.,
p.217.
[35]
Thomas, F. O’ Dea, op. cit., p.4.
[36] Ibid.,
p.13, 14.
[37]
Gunter Kehrer and Bert Hardin, “Sociological Approaches”, Contemporary Approaches
to
the
Study of Religion in 2 Volumes, edited by Fran Whaling, Vol.II. (Berlin:
Mouton Publishers, 1985), p.173.
[38]
Joachim Wach, Sociology of Religion, Twelfth Impression(London
Chicago
Press, 1971), p.3.
[39]
Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, Translated by Ephraim Fishchoff,
third printing
(Boston:
Beacon Press, 1964), p.1.
[40]
Waardenburg, op. cit., p.352.
[41]
Max Weber, op. cit., p.1.
[42] Ibid.
[43]
Waardenburg, op. cit., p.352.
[44]
Thomas L. Benson, op. cit., p.70.
[45] Ibid.,
p.301.
[46] Emile
Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Translated by
Joseph Ward
Swain,
Second Edition (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1976), p.2.
[47]
K. P. Aleaz, Dimensions of Indian Religion, Study, Experience and
Interaction (Calcutta
Punthi Pustak, 1995), p.20.
[48]
P. S. Daniel, David C. Scott, et al., op. cit., p.17.
[49]
J. G. Arapura, op. cit., p.34.
[50]
Thomas L. Benson, op. cit., p.64.
[51]
Frank Whaling ed., Vol.1. op. cit., p.36.
[52]
F. Max Muller, Natural Religion, op. cit., p.88.
[53]
Frank Whaling ed., Vol.1. op. cit., p.37.
[54]
UGO Bianchi, The History of Religions (Netherlands: E.
J. Brill, Leiden, 1975), p.49.
1971),
p.49
[56]
F. Max Muller, Physical Religion, op. cit., p.7.
[57]
F. Max Muller, Natural Religion, op. cit., p.278.
[58]
Frank Whaling ed., op. cit., Vol.I, p.37.
[59]
K. P. Aleaz, op. cit., p.16.
[60] Ibid.,
p.15.
[61]
J. G. Arapura, op. cit., p.49.
[62]
Joseph Pabney Bettis, ed., Phenomenology of Religion, Eight Modern
Descriptions of the
Essence
of Religion (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1969) , p.6.
[63]
Eric J. Lott, Vision, Tradition, Interpretation, Theology, Religion, and the
Study of Religion
(Mouton de Gruyter, 1988), p.179.
[64] Ibid.,
p.191.
[65]
Joseph Dabney Bettis ed., op. cit., p.10.
[66]
Joseph Dabney Bettis ed. op. cit., p.9.
[67]
Waardenburg, op. cit., p.112.
[68]
J. G. Arapura, op. cit., p.42.
[69]
Ursula King, “Phenomenology” edited by Frank Whaling, Vol.I, op. cit., p.88.
[70]
K. P. Aleaz, Dimensions of Indian Religion, Study, Experience and
Interaction, op. cit.,
p.17.
[71]
Joseph Dabney Bettis ed., op. cit., p.11.
[72]
Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, An inquiry into the non-rational factor
in the idea of the divine and its relation to the rational, Translated by
John W. Harvey (Pelican Books, 1959),
p.15.
[73] Ibid.,
p.20.
[74] Ibid.,
p.25.
[75] Ibid.,
p.26.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.,
p.29.
[78] Sibnath
Sarma ed., Religious Philosophy of Rudolf Otto (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1996),pp.97,98.
[79]
Mircea Eliape, The Sacred and the Profane, The Nature of Religion,
Translated from the
French by
Willard R. Trask (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), p.9.
[80]
Sibnath Sarma, ed., op. cit., p.15.
[81] Ibid.,
p.74.
[82] Ibid.,
p.74.
[83]
Waardenburg, op. cit., p.461.
[84] Ibid.,
p.381.
[85] Ibid.,
p.42.
[86] Ibid.,
p.412.
[87]
Thomas L. Benson, op. cit., p.75.
[88]Ibid..
[89] Ibid, p.76.
[90]
Mircea Eliade, op. cit., p.11.
[91] Ibid.
[92]
Jay J. Kim, “Hierophant and History” Journal of the American Academy
No.3
(September, 1972), p.334.
[93]
P. S. Daniel, David C. Scott et al., op. cit., p.24.
Press,
1952), p.52.
[95]
Paul E. Johnson, Psychology of Religion (New York
p.15.
[96]
Walter Houston Clark, The Psychology of Religion, An Introduction to
religious experience and
behavior,
Second Printing (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959), p.29.
[97]
Frank Whaling, Vol.II, op. cit., p.48.
[98]
L. W. Grensted, The Psychology of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952),
p.17.
[99]
Erich Fromm, op. cit., p.31.
[100]
Paul E. Johnson, op. Cit., p.221.
[101]
P. S. Daniel, David C. Scott et al., op. cit., p.26.
[102]
William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Mentor Books,
1958),
p.77.
[103]
William James, op. cit., p.139.
[104] Ibid.,
p.50.
[105]
Waardenburg, op. cit., p.96.
[106]
Erich Fromm, op. cit., p.96.
[107]
Hans Kung, Freud and the Problem of God, Translated by Edward Quinn (New Haven
:Yale
University Press, 1979), p.20.
[108]
Erich Fromm, op. cit., p.79.
[109]
Leighton Mc Cutchen, “The Father Figure in Psychology and Religions” Journal
of the
[110]
Jolande Jacobi, The Psychology of C. G. Jung, 1973 edition, second
printing (Yale
University
Press, 19740 , p.9.
[111] Ibid.,
p.35.
Comments
Post a Comment